Job Protection: The Macho Hypothesis * This paper shows that employment protection is influenced by the male breadwinner conception which is itself shaped by religions. First, by using international individual surveys, we document that Catholics, Muslims and Orthodoxs are more likely to support such "macho values" than Protestants and atheists. Second, we develop a model showing that such a macho bias yields support to job protection legislation. This prediction is strongly supported by OECD panel data regressions including country-fixed effects.
Introduction
The consequence of job protection on labor market performance is now a widely documented issue. However, much less e¤ort has been devoted to understand why di¤erent countries adopt di¤erent employment protection legislations. Our paper tries to …ll this gap. It is argued that employment protection is in ‡uenced by the male breadwinner conception which is itself largely shaped by religious values. Our starting point is that job protection favors job stability for insiders, who are more frequently male than female, but is detrimental to employment opportunities of outsiders, who are more frequently female than male. This point is illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 displays a negative correlation between prime-age female employment rates and the OECD indicator of job protection across OECD countries in the 1990s. Figure 2 suggests that such a negative correlation does not show up for the relation between prime-age male employment rates and job protection. Deeper empirical analysis con…rms these results (Heckman and Pages, 2000) . In this context, one should observe more support to job protection in countries in which a larger share of population agrees with the male breadwinner conception according to which men, owner of the paternal authority, work to bring back income at home while women stay at home to raise children. As shown in the paper, the conception of the gender division of work is strongly in ‡uenced by religions. Namely, Catholics, Muslims, Orthodoxs and -to a lesser extent Buddhists -are much more prone to support the male breadwinner conception than Protestants and una¢liated people. This …nding may account for the negative correlation between the share of individuals a¢liated to the former group of religions and the stringency of job protection across OCDE countries as displayed by 1 Figure 3 .
The interactions between religion, preferences and institutions have recently gained new momentum in echo to the pioneering work of Weber (1905) one century ago. 1 This relation is analyzed more in depth below. tensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes, in 55 countries, controlling for country-…xed e¤ects. They study several economic attitudes towards cooperation, the government, working women, legal rules, thriftiness, and the market economy. They …nd that religious beliefs are associated with economic attitudes conducive to higher per capita income and growth. They also …nd that religious people tend to be less favorable with respect to working women. However, Guiso et al. (2003) provide very few information on the impact of religious denominations on the attitude towards women. This issue has already been addressed by Esping-Andersen (1990) in a classi…cation that distinguishes social-democratic, liberal and conservative-corporatist countries.
The latter are directly associated with the Catholic countries in Continental and Mediterranean Europe. Conservative-corporatism is said to promote the male breadwinner conception. However, if the argument about the in ‡uence of religious denomination looks a priori reasonable, Esping-Andersen does not provide quantitative evidence. Our contribution focuses precisely on 3 this issue for the OECD countries.
Several contributions have also analyzed the impact of religion on economic institutions and economic performance. Stulz and Williamson (2001) show that Catholic countries provide less protection to creditors rights and less support to long-term debt compared to other countries. Barro and McCleary (2002) …nd that economic growth responds positively to the extent of some religious beliefs but negatively to church attendance.
Our paper shows that this line of research can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of the foundation of job protection legislation. In particular, it has the potential to explain the heterogeneity in job protection legislation across-countries, adding a new dimension to the recent job protection political economy literature. In particular, people a¢liated to the former religious group tend to claim that women should not enter the labor market when jobs are scarce for men and that women could endanger family life by working. This empirical result is robust to the inclusion of all traditional individual characteristics and to country-speci…c e¤ects. This evidence strongly suggests that religious a¢liation in ‡uences preferences over the gender division of work.
In section 3, we analyze the impact of the male breadwinner conception on job protection 2 Saint-Paul (2001) and Boeri et al. (2003) have provided political economy models in which the support for employment protection is stronger in economies with higher rents and lower creative destruction in a context where the unskilled are considered as the main winners of employment protection. Fogli (2000) advocates that the level of altruism between parents and their children might explain the higher level of employment protection in Mediterranean countries. However this line of explanation has more to do with inter-generational income insurance rather than employment protection. In particular, it falls short of explaining why these countries prefer to support employment protection per se rather than unemployment bene…ts which are much lower compared to Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries. By contrast, our macho hypothesis does provide a political economy analysis speci…c to employment protection.
policy. First, we provide a political economy model in which the preference for the male breadwinner conception directly enters the utility function. It is shown that more inclination for male breadwinner values yields more stringent employment protection. Moreover, the need for job protection rises when macroeconomic shocks reduce job stability in countries dominated by the male breadwinner conception. This helps explain why job protection legislation become much more stringent in the 1970s in the Mediterranean countries, a puzzle recently outlined by Saint- 
Empirical evidence on family and religious values
This section probes into the empirical impact of religious a¢liation on people's attitude towards the gender division of work. We assess to what extent male breadwinner values come from religious a¢liations and, if any, which religion denomination most matters in this realm. This evaluation closely disentangles the religious e¤ect from the other institutional and individual speci…cities by controlling for country-…xed e¤ects and traditional individual characteristics.
Religious a¢liation and the male breadwinner conception
Not surprisingly, the …rst general statement about the various religious attitudes towards the gender division of work is associated with Weber. In his classic Economy and Society, Weber attributes man's prominence in the public sphere in Catholic and Muslim countries to the messianic message ingrained in these religions. The mission of spreading the religious faith worldwide often meant to be able to raise an army and thus to be a man. By contrast, Protestantism abolished this gender distinction by challenging the messianic role of the Church. Weber's claim seem to have received strong historical support. On the political stage …rst, the Catholic countries seem to have lagged behind their Protestant counterparts in recognizing women's right to vote.
While this political right was implemented in the early 20th century or just after World War I in most Protestant countries 3 , women had to wait until World War II in Catholic, Orthodox or Buddhist ones. 4 Such political rights inequalities seem to have gone hand in hand with economic inequalities. As stated by Duby and Perrot (1998) , World War I did not have the same economic meaning for women in Protestant countries compared to Catholic ones. For both countries, this war coincided with the massive entry of women in the labor market as a contribution to war e¤orts. But while this entry in the public sphere was considered as de…nitive and accompanied by political rights in the former countries, it was discarded as exceptional in the latter ones.
Women were asked to go back to the private family sphere and were even directly banned to participate to the labor market during the Great Depression in countries such as Italy in order to protect their husband's job. The recognition of women's economic rights in Catholic countries took place only after their second contribution to war e¤ort during World War II. Despite this new matter of fact, the current doctrine of the Catholic church is still in favor of the male breadwinner conception. 5 Paulus II, in Encyclic Laborem Exercens, alinea 19, claims: "Just remuneration for the work of an adult who is responsible for a family means remuneration which will su¢ce for establishing and properly maintaining a family and for providing security for its future. Such remuneration can be given either through what is called a family wage -that is, a single salary given to the head of the family fot his work, su¢cient for the needs of the family without the other spouse having to take up gainful employment outside the home -or through other social measures such as family allowances or grants to mothers devoting themselves exclusively to their families. These grants should correspond to the actual needs, that is, to the number of dependents for as long as they are not in a position to assume proper responsibility for their own lives.
Experience con…rms that there must be a social re-evaluation of the mother's role, of the toil connected with it, and of the need that children have for care, love and a¤ection in order that they may develop into responsible, morally and religiously mature and psychologically stable persons. It will redound to the credit of society to make it possible for a mother -without inhibiting her freedom, without psychological or practical discrimination, and without penalizing her as compared with other women -to devote herself to taking care of her children and educating them in accordance with their needs, which vary with age. Having to abandon these tasks in order to 6 However these facts cannot provide direct evidence of a causal link between the religious a¢liation and the family values. At the macrolevel, the cross-country di¤erences in family values could be linked to speci…c country …xed e¤ects rather than to religions. To that respect, one may wonder if the traditional male breadwinner values have more to do with Mediterranean e¤ects rather than religious e¤ects. Empirical studies controlling for country-…xed e¤ects are thus required to solve the problem. But there is also an endogeneity issue at the microlevel.
As stated by Freeman (1986) , "good kids may avoid drugs, stay in school, and go to church".
Thus the correlation between religious a¢liation and attitudes could go the other way around.
To tackle this issue, one has to look for exogenous variables, such as the religious a¢liation of the parents in our case. In sum, the theoretical predictions over the religious e¤ects on family values still lack empirical foundations.
Empirical investigation 2.2.1 Data
Our empirical estimation is based on two international surveys : the World Value Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). These surveys provide complementary information on individual values over religion and gender roles in a large cross-section of countries. The former survey covers three waves (1981-1984, 1990-93 and 1995-1997) . The latter is made up of one speci…c wave devoted to religious a¢liations in 1998 covering the OECD countries. 6 For the sake of comparison, our analysis will be restricted to 21 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey (in WVS only), UK and USA.
The WVS reports three main questions related to the male breadwinner conception. The take up paid work outside the home is wrong from the point of view of the good of society and of the family when it contradicts or hinders these primary goals of the mission of a mother". 6 The ISSP provides a special issue on religious values in 1992 but which covered too few countries to be exploited. Table   5 in the Appendix.
Findings
We estimate the impact of religious a¢liation on gender role values by running Ordered Probit estimations in cross-national regressions. 7 Since the answers are ranked from the lowest value 1 for "Strongly agree" to the highest value 4 for "Strongly disagree", a negative sign indicates that the associated individual characteristic increases the likelihood that the respondent agrees with the statement. In each regression, the religion of reference is Catholicism.
We …rst focus on the most relevant question in the WVS for the issue at stake: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women". In order to disentangle the impact of religious a¢liation from other individual or national characteristics, we follow a two steps approach. Since the religious a¢liation is likely to in ‡uence the other individual characteristics such as education and to be highly correlated to the national culture, we …rst estimate the religious e¤ects by ignoring any additional controls, except time periods. The estimation results, reported in Table 1 -Column (1), suggest a sharp opposition pattern between religious denominations. Protestants and -to a lesser extent-non-religious people are strongly at odds with Catholics to provide job priority to men while Muslims and Buddhists are even more favorable than Catholics to such a policy. The correlations are statistically signi…cant at 1 or 5 percent for these denominations. The correlation pattern is less clear-cut for Jews and people belonging to other religious denominations. This …rst broad picture is thus fully consistent with the heterogeneity in women employment rates and job security legislation observed across countries.
We check the robustness of this correlation pattern by controlling for other individual characteristics and country …xed e¤ects in Table 1 -Column (2). It turns out that the previous opposition between Catholics and Muslims on one side and Protestants on the other side still holds. Remarkably enough, the religious in ‡uence is robust to the inclusion of …xed country e¤ects, suggesting that such religions capture male breadwinner values which are not explained by other cultural features. Interestingly, as shown by Table 2 , the …xed e¤ects coe¢cients indicate that Catholic countries, Buddhist countries (Japan) and Muslim countries (Turkey) have a strong bias in favor of male job priority compared to Protestant countries (either Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian ones). Thus the dominant religion seems to a¤ect individual values by shaping the cultural environment of the respondent. Table 2 also shows that the likelihood to claim male job priority decreases with the level of education and income but increases with age and the fact to be a man. At this stage, it is worthwhile to di¤erentiate the religious e¤ects depending on the gender to highlight the "macho" hypothesis. Table 1 The added-value of this survey is to distinguish more precisely the religious a¢liation and to provide information on the upbringing religion. The additional control variables are the same as those used in the WVS. We …rst estimate the impact of current religious a¢liation on such values. As previously, there is a sharp opposition between Catholics and Muslims on one side and Protestants on the other side whatever the presence of control and …xed e¤ects variables. This section explores the theoretical consequences of the preferences brought to the fore in the previous section on labor market institutions. To that end, we take into account an explicit valuation of the male breadwinner preference in a political economy model in which individuals vote over job protection.
Preferences and technology
We consider a static economy with two goods: labor and a numeraire good. The numeraire good can be produced either at home or by …rms. There are men and women. Both populations have the same size, normalized to one. All men participate in the labor market because their productivity at home is very low. However, women have to choose whether they stay at home or they enter into the labor market. This framework allows us to capture the fact that the wage elasticity of labor supply is close to zero for men and positive for women (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999 ).
The preferences are represented by a utility function that depends on the consumption of the numeraire good, c; on the male employment rate, e m ; and the female labor force participation rate,`f . It is assumed that the utility function takes the simple form: v(c)+Ás(e m ;`f), where v is a twice derivable function, strictly increasing and concave; s is a twice derivable function that is strictly increasing with respect to e m and strictly decreasing with respect to`f; all individuals have the same v and s functions; Á 2 R; which is an individual speci…c parameter, measures the intensity of the concern for male breadwinner values. An individual with higher Á puts more value on marginal increases in male employment rate or marginal decreases in the female labor force participation rate.
Women staying outside the labor market work at home. All women who belong to the labor force, whether employed or unemployed, lose the opportunity to produce at home. Domestic productivity varies across women. The cumulative distribution function of domestic productivity,
The productivity of jobs created by …rms amounts to y 0 > 0 with probability (1 ¡ q).
With probability q; idiosyncratic productivity shocks occur. In that case, the productivity is drawn from a distribution F(y) with support in the range of (¡1; +1): If a low value of the productivity is drawn, the worker can be …red, but the …rm has to pay …ring costs, denoted by p; to the government. p is a pure deadweight loss. The probability q; that productivity shocks occur, will turn out to be useful to analyze the impact of productivity uncertainty on the level of job protection.
Decisions are taken in the following stages:
1. Individuals vote on the level of job protection;
2. "Nature" chooses the domestic productivity of each female;
3. Women decide whether they enter into the labor market;
4. Firms create jobs and sign contracts with workers;
5. "Nature" chooses the productivity of each job;
6. Firms decide whether they keep or destroy their jobs;
The optimal decisions are obtained by backward induction. Accordingly, we …rst describe labor market equilibrium before analyzing the vote over job protection.
Labor market equilibrium
The labor market is competitive. Firms compete to o¤er labor contracts that comprise wages, w(y); which can depend on productivity y; unemployment bene…ts, denoted by b; and the threshold value of productivity below which jobs are destroyed, denoted by R: In equilibrium, the free entry condition implies that contracts maximize the expected utility of workers who participate in the labor market subject to the zero pro…t condition. Accordingly, the optimal contract is the solution to the following program: 8 max fw(y);b;Rg
The …rst-order condition yields
It turns out that all individuals who participate in the labor force get the same income, whether they work or not, because …rms provide full insurance. The labor market income is a decreasing function of the …ring costs that will henceforth be denoted by b(p): In this context, all women whose home production is smaller than the labor market income enter into the labor force. Therefore, the female labor force participation rate reads`f(p) = G(b(p)):
Firing costs have a positive impact on male employment, that is de…ned by
However, …ring costs, which decrease the labor market income b; decrease the female participation rate and have an impact on female employment, e f = G(b)e m ; whose sign is ambiguous.
But job protection is always more favorable to male employment than to female employment, because job protection exerts a negative impact on female participation in the labor market. Accordingly, protecting employment thanks to job protection deteriorates the relative performance of women in the labor market. 9 
The determinants of job protection
At the …rst stage of the sequence of decisions, individuals vote over job protection.
At this stage, the expected utility of men is
Since women do not yet know their domestic productivity when they vote, their expected utility
Knowing that the labor market income b decreases with …ring costs, it appears immediately that both men and women want zero job protection if they have no concern for (or are opposed to) the male breadwinner values. However, as job protection exits females outside the labor force and favors male employment, individuals whose preference for the male breadwinner values is su¢ciently strong support positive …ring costs. For an interior solution, the …rst-order condition reads
where ds(em(p);`f(p)) dp Our model also sheds light on the reaction of labor market institutions to changes in the economic environment. In many countries, job protection legislation has been reinforced during the seventies, when the intensity of job reallocation increased. In our model, this phenomenon ydF (y):The probability of productivity shocks, q; amounts to 0:5: These values imply that the employment rate of men is equal to 75% and the participation rate of women amounts to 75% when¸= 0: can be represented by rises in the probability q of productivity shocks. As shown by 
Empirical religious e¤ects on job protection
The political economy research agenda has recently gained momentum in the theoretical labor The data for the dependent variable and the controls are ten years average. In order to cope with any endogeneity bias, we also provide regressions using past rather than current values of religion. For instance, the average level of employment protection over the 70's is explained by the religious a¢liations in the early 70's rather than its average value over the decay and so on.
Henceforth, the share of Catholic people stands for the religious reference. Thus each estimated coe¢cient should be interpreted as the e¤ect from the associated religion relative to Catholics.
Tab. 4 reports the GLS estimation of the determinants of employment protection. Column Interestingly, the previous religious e¤ects still hold when the employment protection legislation is explained by the lagged value of the various religious shares. Tab. indicates the same opposition pattern between the positive impact of the share of Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox on this legislation compared to the Protestant and the non religious persons.
Yet, the size of the coe¢cient estimates is decreased compared to the speci…cation with current religion in Column (3), suggesting an endogeneity bias in previous regression. But remarkably enough, the religious e¤ect highlighted on aggregate data remains statically signi…cant whatever the speci…cation at stake and provides a picture fully consistent with the one derived from individual values. Religious a¢liations thus turn out to have a signi…cant impact on job protection legislation.
Conclusion
This article has probed into the religious underpinnings of job protection legislation. The stringency of this legislation in Mediterranean countries and Japan has long been recognized to have detrimental e¤ects on women employment rates at the bene…t of incumbent prime age males.
But the new claim of this paper is that such an institution is largely shaped by male breadwinner values conveyed by the dominant religious denominations in these countries. We have …rst On the normative side, such discrepancies in women employment rates give scope to potential reforms, as recommended by the Lisbon treatise. However, the fact that labor market institutions are shaped by religious values make their reform much less clear cut than the naive picture Table 5 reports the main individual characteristics of the respondents in the WVS and the ISSP surveys. The characteristics are quite similar across the two samples. The ordering in the distribution of religious a¢liation is equivalent, with a prominence of Catholic, Protestant and Atheist in the OECD sample. The variable "Age" is expressed in age. The variable "Education" is the age at which the respondent completed her highest education. The variable "Income" derives from the question : "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other income that come in". The variable is ranked into deciles. We constructed three categories : low income (1th-3th deciles), mean income (4th-6th) and high income (7th-10th). 
Estimation results on gender role values

